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Abstract
A major problem in the consistent-histories approach to quantum theory is
contending with the potentially large number of consistent sets of history propo-
sitions. One possibility is to find a scheme in which a unique set is selected in
some way. However, in this paper we consider the alternative approach in which
all consistent sets are kept, leading to a type of ‘many world-views’ picture of
the quantum theory. It is shown that a natural way of handling this situation is
to employ the theory of varying sets (presheafs) on the space B of all Boolean
subalgebras of the orthoalgebra UP of history propositions. This approach auto-
matically includes the feature whereby probabilistic predictions are meaningful
only in the context of a consistent set of history propositions. More strikingly, it
leads to a picture in which the ‘truth values’, or ‘semantic values’ of such contex-
tual predictions are not just two-valued (i.e., true and false) but instead lie in a
larger logical algebra—a Heyting algebra—whose structure is determined by the
space B of Boolean subalgebras of UP.
This topos-theoretic structure thereby gives a coherent mathematical frame-
work in which to understand the internal logic of the many world-views picture
that arises naturally in the approach to quantum theory based on the ideas of
consistent histories.
1email: c.isham@ic.ac.uk
1 Introduction
The consistent-histories approach to standard quantum theory was pioneered by Grif-
fiths (1984), Omne`s (1988a, 1988b, 1988c, 1989, 1990, 1992), Gell-Mann and Hartle
(1990a, 1990b) and Hartle (1991, 1995) and was motivated in part by a desire to find
an interpretation of quantum theory that is less instrumentalist than is that of the
standard ‘Copenhagen’ view. Such a move is particularly desirable in the context of
quantum cosmology, where any reference to an ‘external observer’ seems singularly
inappropriate. At a more technical level, the consistent-histories scheme provides an
attractive framework in which to develop any views on quantum gravity where the
microstructure of spacetime itself is deemed to be the subject of quantum effects. In
particular, questions about the probabilities of various ‘generalised’ space-times be-
ing realised in the universe are difficult to pose and analyse in the more traditional
approaches to quantum theory.
The central idea in the consistent-histories scheme is that (i) under certain con-
ditions it is possible to assign probabilities to history propositions of a system rather
than—as in standard quantum theory—only to propositions concerning properties at
a fixed time; and (ii) these probabilities refer to ‘the way things are’ in some—as yet
rather problematic—sense rather than to the results of possible measurements made
by an observer from outside the system. A key ingredient in the theory is the ‘deco-
herence function’—a complex-valued function d(α, β) of history propositions α, β that
measures the ‘quantum interference’ between them. A complete2 set of history propo-
sitions C := {α1, α2, . . . , αn} is said to be (strongly) d-consistent if d(αi, αj) = 0 for
all i 6= j, and under these circumstances the probability that αi will be realised is
identified with the real number d(αi, αi) (the formalism is such that these numbers
always sum to 1 in a consistent set).
Whether or not this scheme really answers the interpretational questions in quantum
theory has been much debated; for example Halliwell (1995), Dowker and Kent (1995,
1996) and Kent (1996). The central problem is the existence of many d-consistent sets
that are mutually incompatible in the sense that they cannot be combined to give a
single larger set. An analogous situation arises in standard quantum theory but there
the problem is resolved by the ubiquitous external observer deciding to measure one
observable rather than another. However, this option is not available in the history
framework and the problem must be addressed in some way that is internal to the
theory itself.
A priori there are two quite different ways of approaching this plethora of d-
consistent sets. The first is to try to select a unique one that is ‘realised’ in the
actual physical world. This might involve some natural choice within the context of
the existing framework, or it could mean looking for a new physical process. The
former is typical of those approaches to the ‘many worlds’—or, in some views, ‘many
2A set of history propositions is complete if (i) the physical realisation of any one of them necessarily
excludes all the others; and (ii) one of them must be realised.
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minds’—interpretation3 of quantum theory in which a preferred basis in the Hilbert
space of states is used to select one special branch. An scheme of this type is proposed
in Isham and Linden (1996).
The second option is to accept the plethora of d-consistent sets as a new type of
many worlds or, perhaps better, ‘many world-views’ interpretation of quantum theory.
Understanding what is meant by ‘many worlds’ in existing quantum theory is inhibited
by the difficulty of finding a proper mathematical representation of the concept, and
hence of assessing it in anything other than a rather heuristic way. However, the
situation is otherwise in the consistent-histories formalism if the different ‘worlds’, or
‘world-views’, are identified with the different d-consistent sets. We shall show how
the mathematical structure of the collection of all complete sets of history propositions
can be exploited to provide a novel logic with which to interpret the probabilistic
predictions of the theory in the many world-views context where all d-consistent sets
are handled at once. This involves a type of logical algebra in which probabilistic
propositions are (i) manifestly ‘contextual’ in regard to a complete set (which need not
necessarily be d-consistent); and (ii) not simply binary-valued (i.e., not just true or
false). However, this algebra is not a ‘quantum logic’ in the usual sense of the phrase
since it is distributive. On the other hand, it is not a simple classical Boolean algebra
either; rather, it is an example of an ‘intuitionistic’ logic.
Of course, the idea that probabilistic assertions must be made in the context of a
d-consistent set is not new—the theme has run through the entire development of the
histories programme and, in particular, has been re-emphasised recently by Griffiths
(1993, 1996). However, allowing the context to be a general complete set and, more
dramatically, the use of a ‘multi-valued’ logic are new departures although, as I hope to
show, they follow naturally from the mathematical structure of the consistent-histories
formalism. Indeed, the basic idea is easy enough to state although its ramifications
lead at once to concepts drawn from the sophisticated branch of mathematics known
as ‘topos4 theory’.
To see how topos ideas arise, suppose that C is a complete set of history propositions
that is not d-consistent: what would be the status of a probabilistic prediction made
in this context? One response is “none at all”, but a more physically appropriate
observation is that even if C is not itself d-consistent it might admit a coarse-graining
C ′ (i.e., a set of propositions, each of which is a sum of propositions in C) that is d-
consistent and in which the probabilistic prediction does become meaningful; in other
words, by agreeing to use less precise propositions we may arrive at a situation where
probabilities can be assigned meaningfully. However, we then note that (i) any further
coarse-grainings of C ′ will also be d-consistent; and (ii) there may be many such initial
choices C ′ and the same holds for further coarse-grainings of any of them. In the
language of topos theory this says that the collection of all d-consistent coarse-grainings
of C forms a sieve on C with respect to the partial-ordering induced by coarse-graining.
3For a recent review see Butterfield (1996).
4A topos is a special type of category. The relevant details are given further on in the paper.
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The main idea is to assign this sieve as the ‘truth value’—or, perhaps better, the
‘meaning’ or ‘semantic value’—of a proposition in the context of C. The crucial fact
that underpins this suggestion is that the set of all such sieves does indeed form a
logical algebra, albeit one that contains more than just the values ‘true’ and ‘false’.
The natural occurrence of sieves in the consistent-histories scheme is the primary
motivation for claiming that topos theory—especially the theory of sets varying over a
partially-ordered set—is the natural mathematical tool with which to probe the internal
logic of this particular approach to quantum theory. Fortunately, for our purposes it is
not necessary to delve too deeply5 into this—rather abstract—branch of mathematics,
and to facilitate the exposition the paper starts with a short summary of some of
the relevant ideas about varying sets. This is followed by a discussion of the crucial
poset6 of all Boolean subalgebras of the quantum algebra of history propositions. We
then come to the heart of the paper where the appropriate sets of semantic values for
propositions in the consistent-histories programme are investigated. Some less central
technical material is relegated to the appendices.
2 The Topos of Varying Sets
2.1 Second-level propositions
We begin with the simplest of remarks. In standard set theory, to each subset A of a
set X there is associated a ‘characteristic map’ χA : X → {0, 1} defined by
χA(x) :=
{
1 if x ∈ A;
0 otherwise
(2.1)
so that
A = (χA)−1{1}. (2.2)
Conversely, any function χ : X → {0, 1} defines a unique subset Aχ := χ
−1{1} of X
whose characteristic function is equal to χ.
Next, consider a hypothetical classical theory whose basic ingredient is a Boolean
lattice UP of propositions about the physical universe7. A ‘pure state’ σ of the system
will give rise to a valuation on UP , i.e., a homomorphism V σ : UP → Ω from UP
to the simplest Boolean algebra Ω := {0, 1} with ‘0’ interpreted as ‘false’ and ‘1’ as
true. Thus a valuation is a characteristic map that is also a homomorphism between
Boolean algebras.
5I have deliberately avoided any serious use of category language in the main text of the paper but
have added some more technical remarks in the footnotes.
6The word ‘poset’ is an abbreviation for ‘partially-ordered set’.
7By ‘universe’ I mean the physical world with all its spatio-temporal aspects. Thus we are talking
about ‘generalised histories’, not states of affairs at a fixed time.
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Now let us consider what a probabilistic version of such a theory might look like.
In theories with a realist flavour—as is, arguably, the case with the consistent-histories
programme—there is a temptation (to which I shall succumb) to interpret probability
in the sense of ‘propensity’ rather than in terms of (intersubjective) states of knowledge
or relative frequency of repeated measurements. In particular, the proposition “α ∈ UP
is true with probability p” (to be denoted by 〈α, p〉) is to be read as saying that the
state of affairs represented by α has an ‘intrinsic tendency’ to occur that is measured
by the number p ∈ [0, 1]. Thus the referent of 〈α, p〉 is to be construed as being the
universe ‘itself’ in some way rather than, in particular, our knowledge of the universe
or the results of sequences of measurements. A proposition of this type will be labelled
‘second-level by which I mean simply that it is a proposition about the universe that
itself involves a proposition α ∈ UP .
At a mathematical level, we observe that to each probability measure µ on UP (a
‘statistical state’ of the system), and for each p ∈ [0, 1], there is associated the subset
of all α ∈ UP such that µ(α) = p. In turn, this gives rise to the characteristic map
χµ,p : UP → {0, 1} defined by
χµ,p(α) :=
{
1 if µ(α) = p;
0 otherwise
(2.3)
as a particular example of the situation represented by (2.1).
Note that the characteristic map in (2.3) is not a valuation on UP—no role is played
by the Boolean structure on UP which, in this situation, is regarded purely as a set .
On the other hand, we can think of the second-level propositions 〈α, p〉 as generating
a new logical algebra with respect to which each measure µ on UP produces a genuine
{0, 1}-valued valuation V µ defined by
V µ〈α, p〉 :=
{
1 if µ(α) = p;
0 otherwise.
(2.4)
Thus, for example, the conjunction operation on these new propositions is defined to
be such that, for all µ,
V µ(〈α, p〉 ∧ 〈β, q〉) :=
{
1 if µ(α) = p and µ(β) = q;
0 otherwise.
(2.5)
This leads naturally to the idea of two second-level propositions being µ-semantically
equivalent if their V µ valuations are equal, and semantically equivalent if they are µ-
semantically equivalent for all measures µ. For example, for all µ and all p ∈ [0, 1] we
have
V µ〈α, p〉 = V µ〈¬α, 1− p〉 (2.6)
since µ(α) + µ(¬α) = 1 for all α ∈ UP. Hence 〈α, p〉 and 〈¬α, 1− p〉 are semantically
equivalent for all p ∈ [0, 1]. A more complex example is given by the result that, for
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any disjoint propositions α and β (i.e., α ∧ β = 0),
V µ〈α ∨ β, p〉 = V µ

 ∨
q∈[0,1]
〈α, p− q〉 ∧ 〈β, q〉

 (2.7)
which arises from the fact that µ(α∨β) = µ(α)+µ(β) for any such pair of propositions.
Thus we see that, if α∧β = 0, then 〈α∨β, p〉 and
∨
q∈[0,1]〈α, p−q〉∧〈β, q〉 are semantically
equivalent for all p ∈ [0, 1].
The situation in the consistent-histories programme is similar in many respects.
Once again, there is an algebra UP of ‘universe propositions’ although—as part of a
quantum theory—it is no longer Boolean. There are also second-level propositions of
the type 〈α, p〉, although the role of a probability measure µ : UP → IR is now taken
by a decoherence function d : UP × UP → |C. However, the really significant new
features of the consistent-histories theory are that (i) a proposition 〈α, p〉 is physically
meaningful only in the context of a d-consistent set (or, as we shall see, any complete
set) of histories; and (ii) as we shall show, the associated truth values, or semantic
values, can be regarded as lying in an algebra that is larger than {0, 1}.
2.2 Sets through time
As an example8 of how contexts and generalised semantic values can arise, consider
a fixed set X of people who are all alive at some initial time, and whose bodies are
preserved once they die (and who are still referred to as ‘people’ in that state). Thus
if D(t) ⊆ X denotes the subset of dead people at any time t, then as t increases D(t)
will clearly stay constant or increase, i.e., t1 ≤ t2 implies D(t1) ⊆ D(t2). Such a
parameterised family of sets D(t), t ∈ IR, is an example of what has been called a
“set through time” by those working in the foundations of topos theory; for example
Lawvere (1975), Bell (1988), MacLane and Moerdijk (1992).
Now suppose that some members of our population are—in fact—immortal. Sup-
pose also that the members of X are all philosophers with a nostalgic leaning towards
logical positivism. Then what truth value should be assigned to the proposition “per-
son x is mortal” if all truth statements are required to be verifiable in some operational
sense? If death has already occurred by the time the proposition is asserted then, of
course, the proposition is true (assuming that the deadness of a body is something
that can be confirmed operationally). However, if x is alive the proposition cannot be
said to be true—on the assumption that mortality of a living being cannot be verified
operationally—but neither can it be denied, since even if x is numbered among the
immortals there is no way of showing this. Thus we are lead to the notion of a ‘stage
of truth’ as the context in which a proposition acquires meaning—in our case, the time
8A similar example has been explored by Dummett (1959) in the form of the proposition “A city
will never be built on this spot”; I thank Jeremy Butterfield for this observation.
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t—and to the idea that the truth values of a statement at a stage t may not just lie in
the set {0, 1}.
Of course, a dedicated verificationist will simply insist that the proposition “x is
mortal” is meaningless if asserted at a time t0 when x is not dead. However, topos
theory provides a more positive answer that stems from the observation that there
may be a later time t at which x does die, and then of course x ∈ D(t′) for all times
t′ ≥ t. A key idea in the theory of sets-through-time is that the ‘truth value’—or,
perhaps better, the ‘meaning’ or ‘semantic value’—at the stage t0 of the proposition
“x is mortal” is defined to be the set χDt0(x) of all later times
9 t at which x is dead:
χDt0(x) := { t ≥ t0 | x ∈ D(t) }. (2.8)
Note that if x never dies, i.e., if he or she is immortal, then the right hand side of
(2.8) is just the empty set. On the other hand, x is dead at a time t if and only if
χDt (x) =↑(t) := [t,∞). (2.9)
Equivalently, at stage t we have
D(t) = (χDt )
−1{↑(t)}. (2.10)
When compared with (2.1), the relation (2.10) shows that the parameterised family of
maps χDt0 : X → Ω(t0), t0 ∈ IR, (where Ω(t0) denotes the collection of all upper sets
lying above t0) is the analogue of the single characteristic function of normal set theory.
From a logical perspective, the crucial property of this set Ω(t0) of all possible
semantic values at stage t0 is that it possesses the structure of a Heyting algebra. Thus
Ω(t0) is a distributive lattice with the property that for any a, b ∈ Ω(t0) there is a
unique element (a⇒ b) ∈ Ω(t0) (with the intuitive meaning “if a then b”) satisfying
c ≤ (a⇒ b) if and only if c ∧ a ≤ b. (2.11)
The negation operation in such an algebra is defined by ¬a := (a ⇒ 0), and satisfies
the relation a ≤ ¬¬a for all a.10 Indeed, it can be shown that a Heyting algebra is
Boolean if and only if a = ¬¬a for all a.
2.3 Sets varying over a partially-ordered set
A key fact for our programme is that the ideas sketched above extend readily to the
situation where the ‘stages of truth’ are elements of a general partially-ordered set P;
9The example gets a little artificial at this point in the sense that a transtemporal view of the
history of the population X is needed for the semantic values to be appreciated: clearly a job for one
of the immortals!
10This is one of the main reasons why a Heyting algebra is chosen as the formal mathematical
structure that underlies intuitionistic logic. Thus there is a strong connection between the theory of
sets through time and the logic of intuitionism.
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for example, Bell (1988). In our case, P will be the set of Boolean subalgebras of the
space of quantum history propositions with W1 ≤ W2 defined to mean W2 ⊆ W1 (so
thatW2 is a ‘coarse-graining’ ofW1). The necessary mathematical development is most
naturally expressed in the language of category theory, although for our purposes all
that is really needed is the idea that a category consists of a collection of things called
‘objects’—mathematical entities with some precisely defined internal structure—and
‘morphisms’ between pairs of such objects, where a morphism is a type of structure-
preserving ‘map’ (but not necessarily in the sense of set theory).
The relevant category for us is the category SetP of “varying sets over P”. Here, an
object X is defined to be an assignment to each p ∈ P of a set X(p), and an assignment
to each pair p ≤ q of a map Xpq : X(p) → X(q) such that (i) Xpp is the identity map
on X(p), and (ii) the following relations are satisfied11
Xqr ◦Xpq = Xpr (2.12)
whenever p ≤ q ≤ r.
A morphism η : Y → X between two such objects Y,X in SetP is defined to be a
family of maps ηp : Y (p)→ X(p), p ∈ P, satisfying the compatibility conditions
12
ηq ◦ Ypq = Xpq ◦ ηp (2.13)
as shown in the commutative diagram
Y (p)yηp
X(p)
Ypq
−→
Xpq
−→
Y (q)yηq
X(q)
(2.14)
In particular, a subobject of a varying set13 X = {X(p), p ∈ P} is a varying set
A = {A(p), p ∈ P} with the property that A(p) ⊆ X(p) for all p ∈ P, and such
that Apq : A(p) → A(q) is just the restriction of Xpq : X(p) → X(q) to the subset
A(p) ⊆ X(p). These relations are captured nicely by the commutative diagram
A(p)y
X(p)
Apq
−→
Xpq
−→
A(q)y
X(q)
(2.15)
where the vertical arrows are subset inclusions.
11What is being exploited here is the familiar fact that a poset P can be regarded as a category in
its own right in which (i) the objects are the elements of P ; and (ii) there are no morphisms p → q
unless p ≤ q, in which case there is just one. A ‘varying set over P ’ is then just a functor from the
category P to the category ‘Set’ of normal sets. This is closely related to the concept of a ‘presheaf’
on P .
12If P is regarded as a category then η is a ‘natural transformation’ between the functors Y and X .
13The notation does not include a specific reference to the functions Xpq : X(p)→ X(q), but these
are understood to be implicitly included.
7
A simple, but important, special case is when the varying setX(p) is in fact constant
i.e., X(p) = X for all p ∈ P, and Xpq is the identity map from X = X(p) to X = X(q)
for all pairs p ≤ q. In this situation, each set A(p), p ∈ P, can be regarded as a subset
of the fixed set X , and the condition on a varying set A := {A(p), p ∈ P} to be a bona
fide subobject of X is simply that
p ≤ q implies A(p) ⊆ A(q). (2.16)
This special case where X(p) is constant also gives rise to the varying-set analogue
of a ‘complement’ of a subset. The obvious family of subsets of X to serve as the
complement of {A(p), p ∈ P} is {X − A(p), p ∈ P}, but this does not give a proper
varying set since p ≤ q implies X−A(p) ⊇ X−A(q), which is the wrong behaviour. It
turns out that the appropriate definition is the genuine varying set ¬A := {¬A(p), p ∈
P} where
¬A(p) := {x ∈ X | ∀q ≥ p, x 6∈ A(q)}. (2.17)
It follows that x 6∈ ¬A(p) if and only if there is some q ≥ p such that x ∈ A(q), and
hence
¬¬A(p) := {x ∈ X | ∀q ≥ p ∃ r ≥ q s.t. x ∈ A(r)}. (2.18)
We see that A(p) ⊆ ¬¬A(p) whereas, in normal set theory, the double complement
of a subset is always equal to the subset itself. This non-standard behaviour in the
varying-set theory is a reflection of the fact that the underlying logical structure is
non-Boolean (see later).
As in the case of sets through time, a key role is played by the collections Ω(p),
p ∈ P, of all upper sets lying above p. More precisely, a sieve14 on p in P is defined to
be any subset S of P such that if r ∈ S then (i) r ≥ p, and (ii) r′ ∈ S for all r′ ≥ r.
For each p ∈ P, the set Ω(p) of all sieves on p can be shown to be a Heyting algebra15,
and for all pairs p ≤ q there is a natural map Ωpq : Ω(p)→ Ω(q) defined by
Ωpq(S) := S∩ ↑(q) (2.19)
where ↑(q) := {r ∈ P | r ≥ q} is the unit element in the Heyting algebra Ω(q) (the
null element is the empty set). It is easy to see that, with the maps Ωpq in (2.19),
Ω := {Ω(p), p ∈ P} is a varying set over P and hence an object in the category SetP .
A very important example of the use of Ω occurs if A is a subobject of the object
X . There is then an associated characteristic morphism χA : X → Ω with, at each
stage p ∈ P, the ‘component’ χAp : X(p)→ Ω(p) being defined by
χAp (x) := { q ≥ p | Xpq(x) ∈ A(q) } (2.20)
14This is the notation employed by in Bell (1988); other authors (for example, MacLane and Mo-
erdijk, 1992) use the term ‘cosieve’ for what Bell calls a ‘sieve’, and vice versa.
15The precise algebraic relations will be given later for the specific example of interest in the
consistent-histories theory.
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where the fact that the right hand side of (2.20) actually is a sieve on p in P follows from
the defining properties of a subobject. Thus in each ‘branch’ of the poset going up from
p, χAp (x) picks out the first member q (the “time till truth”) in that branch for which
Xpq(x) lies in the subset A(q), and the commutative diagram (2.15) then guarantees
that Xpr(x) will lie in A(r) for all r ≥ q. In the special case where X(p) = X for all p,
(2.21) simplifies to (c.f. (2.8))
χAp (x) := { q ≥ p | x ∈ A(q) }. (2.21)
In what follows, the expression (2.21) plays a crucial role as the analogue in the
theory of varying sets of the characteristic map (2.1) χA : X → {0, 1} of normal set
theory. Indeed, the analogue of the relation (2.2) for the situation epitomised by (2.21)
is (c.f. (2.10))
A(p) = (χAp )
−1{ ↑(p) } (2.22)
at each stage p ∈ P. Conversely, each morphism χ : X → Ω defines a subobject of X
(via (2.22)), and for this reason the object Ω in SetP is known as the subobject classifier
in the category SetP ; the existence of such an object is one of the defining properties16
for a category to be a topos, which SetP is. As the target of characteristic maps (i.e., the
analogue of {0, 1} in normal set theory), Ω can be thought of as the ‘object of truth
values’—an assignation that is reinforced by the observation that Ω has an internal
structure of a Heyting algebra. For example, the conjunction ∧ : Ω×Ω→ Ω is defined
to be the morphism in the category SetP whose components ∧p : Ω(p)×Ω(p)→ Ω(p),
p ∈ P, are the conjunctions ∧p in the ‘local’ Heyting algebras Ω(p); the other logical
operations are defined in a similar way.
The main thesis of the present paper is that a situation closely analogous to the
one sketched above arises naturally in the theory of consistent histories where the basic
quantum ingredients are an orthoalgebra UP of history propositions and a specific
decoherence function d. In particular, we have (i) the idea of a ‘context’ or a ‘stage’;
and (ii) the property that—at each such stage—the truth values lie in a Heyting algebra.
As emphasised already, the key point in the formalism of consistent histories is that
we are concerned with assertions of the type 〈α, p〉 (“the probability of the history
proposition α ∈ UP is p”) but these only have a physical meaning in the context of
a particular d-consistent set of propositions to which α belongs or, to be more precise
(see later), in the context of any set of propositions that can be coarse-grained to give
a d-consistent set that contains α. It is technically convenient to employ the Boolean
subalgebra of UP generated by a set of history propositions, rather than the set itself,
and in this framework my thesis is essentially that
• each Boolean subalgebra W0 of the set UP of all history propositions can serve
as a possible ‘stage’; and
16Another defining property for a category C to be a topos is that a product A× B exists for any
pair of objects A,B in C. For the full definition see one of the standard texts (for example Bell 1988,
MacLane and Moerdijk 1992)
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• the truth value (or semantic value) of 〈α, p〉 at a particular stage W0 is related to
the collection of all coarse-grainingsW ofW0 that contain α and are d-consistent.
As we shall see, the implementation of this idea involves a specific application of
the idea of sets varying over a poset, and hence we do indeed obtain a Heyting algebra
of possible semantic values at each stage. Moreover, we will show how propositions of
the type 〈α, p〉 can be associated with Ω-valued morphisms; as such, they belong to
the internal logic (and, indeed, formal language) that is associated with the topos SetB
where B denotes the poset of all Boolean subalgebras of UP (see below for details).
Thus the internal logic of the topos provides a framework for understanding the logical
structure of probabilistic predictions in a consistent-histories theory in a way that au-
tomatically includes all possible contextual references to d-consistent sets. We thereby
arrive at a coherent logical structure for this particular ‘many world-views’ picture of
quantum theory.
3 Boolean Subalgebras of Propositions
3.1 The general formalism of consistent histories
In the general approach to the consistent-history formalism developed by Isham (1994)
and Isham and Linden (1994), the central mathematical ingredient is a pair (UP,D)
where UP is an orthoalgebra17 of ‘history propositions’ and D is the space of decoher-
ence functions defined on this algebra (for a short summary of the scheme see Isham,
1995).
It should be emphasised from the outset that, in practice, the orthoalgebra formal-
ism is much less abstract than it might appear at first. In particular, for any given
physical system it is always appropriate to consider the possibility that UP may sim-
ply be the algebra P (V) of projection operators on some Hilbert space V; in this case,
α ⊕ β is defined if and only if αβ = 0, and then α ⊕ β = α + β. For example, it was
shown in Isham (1994) that the history version of normal quantum theory for, say, a
finite number of time points {t1, t2, . . . , tn} can be cast into this form. Specifically, the
history propositions are identified as projection operators on the tensor product space
Ht1 ⊗ Ht2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Htn where each Hti is a copy of the Hilbert space of states H of
17An orthoalgebra UP is a partially-ordered set with greatest element 1 and least element 0 and
for which there is a notion of when two elements α, β are orthogonal , denoted α ⊥ β. If α and β are
such that α ⊥ β then they can be combined to give a new element α⊕ β ∈ UP. Furthermore, α ≤ β
if and only if β = α ⊕ γ for some γ ∈ UP . There is also a negation operation with α ⊕ ¬α = 1 (for
the full definition of an orthoalgebra see Foulis, Greechie and Ru¨ttimann, 1992). It should be noted
that the structure of an orthoalgebra is much weaker than that of a lattice. In the latter there are
two connectives ∧ and ∨, both of which are defined on all pairs of elements, unlike the single, partial,
operation ⊕ in an orthoalgebra. A lattice is a special type of orthoalgebra with α ⊕ β being defined
on disjoint lattice elements α, β (i.e., those for which α ≤ ¬β) as α⊕ β := α ∨ β.
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standard canonical quantum theory. The extension of this idea to a continuous time
variable is discussed in Isham and Linden (1995).
Returning to the general formalism we recall that a decoherence function is a map
d : UP × UP → |C that satisfies the following conditions:
1. Hermiticity: d(α, β) = d(β, α)∗ for all α, β.
2. Positivity: d(α, α) ≥ 0 for all α.
3. Additivity: if α ⊥ β (i.e., α and β are orthogonal) then, for all γ, d(α⊕ β, γ) =
d(α, γ) + d(β, γ).
4. Normalisation: d(1, 1) = 1.
Note that the additivity condition implies that, for all α ∈ UP ,
d(0, α) = 0. (3.1)
We also note that, as shown by Isham, Linden and Schreckenberg (1994), in the concrete
case where UP = P (V) for some Hilbert space V every decoherence function can be
written in the form
d(α, β) = trV⊗V(α⊗ βX) (3.2)
where X belongs to a precisely specified class of operators on V ⊗ V.
Following Gell-Mann and Hartle, a finite set C := {α1, α2, . . . , αN} of non-zero
propositions is said to be complete if (i) αi ⊥ αj for all i, j = 1, 2, . . . , N ; (ii) the
elements of C are ‘jointly compatible’, i.e., they belong to some Boolean subalgebra
of UP; and (iii) α1 ⊕ α2 ⊕ . . .⊕ αN = 1. In algebraic terms, a complete set of history
propositions is simply a finite partition of unity in the orthoalgebra UP .
It should be noted that in the history version of standard quantum theory, the
decoherence function for a particular system depends on both the initial state and the
Hamiltonian. Thus, in general, for any specific history system the decoherence function
d will be one particular element of D. It must be emphasised that only d-consistent
sets of history propositions are given an immediate physical interpretation. A complete
set C of history propositions is said to be18 d-consistent if d(α, β) = 0 for all α, β ∈ C
such that α 6= β. Under these circumstances d(α, α) is regarded as the probability that
the history proposition α is true. The axioms above then guarantee that the usual
Kolmogoroff probability rules are satisfied on the Boolean algebra generated by C.
It is worth noting that the idea of an orthoalgebra is closely related to that of
a Boolean manifold : an algebra that is ‘covered’ by a collection of maximal Boolean
18In what follows I shall only consider the strong case where d(α, β) itself vanishes, rather than
just the real part of d(α, β). The phrase ‘consistent set’ will always mean ‘strongly’ consistent in this
sense.
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subalgebras with appropriate compatibility conditions on any pair that overlap (Harde-
gree and Frazer, 1982). Being Boolean, these subalgebras of propositions carry a logical
structure that is essentially classical: a feature of the consistent-histories scheme that
was focal in the seminal work of Griffiths and Omne`s and that has been re-emphasised
recently by Griffiths (1993, 1996). In the approach outlined above, these Boolean
algebras are glued together from the outset to form an orthoalgebra UP of proposi-
tions from which the physically interpretable subsets are selected by the consistency
conditions with respect to a chosen decoherence function.
Any partition of unity C := {α1, α2, . . . , αN} generates a Boolean algebra whose
elements are the finite19 ⊕-sums of elements of C (hence the elements of C are atoms
of this algebra). If C is d-consistent, and if α := ⊕i∈I1αi and β := ⊕j∈I2αj are two
members of the algebra (where I1 and I2 are subsets of the index set {1, 2, . . . , N})
then, by the additivity property of the decoherence function d,
d(α, β) =
∑
i∈I1∩I2
d(αi, αi). (3.3)
On the other hand
α ∧ β =
⊕
i∈I1∩I2
αi (3.4)
and so
d(α, β) = d(α ∧ β, α ∧ β) (3.5)
for all α, β.
In a general orthoalgebra UP not every Boolean subalgebra is necessarily generated
by a partition of unity—for example, any Boolean subalgebra that is not atomic falls in
this class. Partly for this reason it is helpful to define consistency for Boolean algebras
per se, rather than go via partitions of unity. However, it is also pedagogically useful
to do so as it emphasises the essentially ‘classical’ nature of the properties of the
propositions in a d-consistent set. The set of all Boolean subalgebras of UP is denoted
B and, motivated by (3.5), we propose the following definition:
Definition 3.1
For a given history system (UP, d), where d ∈ D, a Boolean subalgebra W ∈ B
of UP is d-consistent if, for all α, β ∈ W we have d(α, β) = d(α ∧ β, α ∧ β).
Note that the smallest subalgebra {0, 1} is trivially d-consistent for any d since,
by (3.1), we have d(0, 1) = 0 = d(0, 0) = d(0∧1, 0∧1). The set of all d-consistent
Boolean subalgebras of UP will be denoted Bd.
The relation of this definition to the earlier one of strong consistency is contained
in the following lemma.
19With appropriate care these ideas an be generalised to include countable sets and sums, but the
details are not important here.
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Lemma The condition (3.5) on all elements α, β in a Boolean subalgebra W is equiv-
alent to
d(α, β) = 0 for all α, β ∈ W such that α ⊥ β. (3.6)
Proof Suppose that (3.5) is true and let α ⊥ β. Then α∧β = 0 (in a Boolean algebra,
α ⊥ β if and only if α ∧ β = 0) and hence d(α, β) = d(0, 0) = 0.
Conversely, suppose (3.6) is true and let α, β ∈ W . Then there exist jointly orthog-
onal elements α1, β1, γ1 ∈ W such that α = α1 ⊕ γ and β = β1 ⊕ γ. Indeed, we can
choose α1 := α∧¬β, β1 := β ∧¬α and γ := α∧ β, where the general lattice operation
∧ is well defined in this Boolean subalgebra. Then, by the additivity property of the
decoherence function,
d(α, β) = d(α1 ⊕ γ, β1 ⊕ γ) = d(α1, β1) + d(α1, γ) + d(γ, β1) + d(γ, γ)
= d(α ∧ β, α ∧ β) (3.7)
since (3.6) means that α1 ⊥ β1 implies d(α1, β1) = 0 etc. QED
In what follows I shall refer to a Boolean subalgebra of UP as a window in order to
convey the idea that it affords a potential way of ‘looking’ at the physical world; the
initial letter ‘w’ also serves to remind us that a window can be regarded as a possible
‘world-view’, or even ‘weltanschauung’. A d-consistent window is what Griffiths (1996)
calls a ‘framework’.
3.2 Key features of the space B of Boolean subalgebras
At this point it is useful to recall a number of standard properties possessed by B that
will be important in what follows.
1. B is a partially ordered set with respect to subset inclusion, and we writeW1 ≤W2
if W1 ⊇W2 (we define W1 ≤W2 in this way rather than as W1 ⊆W2 in order to
be consistent with our earlier discussion of sets varying over a poset). For such
a pair W1 ≤ W2 we say that (i) W1 is a fine-graining of W2; and (ii) W2 is a
coarse-graining of W1 (for convenience, this terminology includes the idea that
any window W ∈ B is both a coarse-graining and a fine-graining of itself). We
note that
(a) the greatest element of (B,≤) is {0, 1};
(b) there is no least element (because there exist many quantum propositions
α, β ∈ UP that are not compatible, i.e., α and β cannot be members of
the same Boolean algebra) but by Zorn’s lemma each descending20 chain of
windows has a minimal element.
20To avoid confusion note that a chain · · · ≤ W2 ≤ W1 ≤ W0 of windows that is descending
with respect to the ≤ ordering is an ascending chain W0 ⊆ W1 ⊆ W2 · · · with respect to subalgebra
inclusion.
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2. A join operation can be defined on the poset (B,≤) by
W1 ∨W2 :=W1 ∩W2. (3.8)
3. A general pair W1,W2 of windows will not have a meet W1 ∧W2 since they will
not both be subsets of any larger Boolean algebra. However, if they are Boolean
compatible (i.e., if there exists a Boolean algebra that contains them both) then
W1 ∧W2 exists as the intersection of all W ∈ B such that W ⊇ W1 ∪W2.
4. The set Bd of d-consistent windows is a subset of B and inherits its partial-
ordering structure. In particular, if W2 is d-consistent then so is any W1 ≥
W2; thus coarse-graining preserves d-consistency—a crucial property for our later
discussions.
However, it is worth noting that ifW1 andW2 are both d-consistent and ifW1∧W2
exists as a Boolean subalgebra, it will generally not be d-consistent. In particular,
there is generally no biggest (with respect to ⊆) d-consistent coarse-graining of
a non d-consistent window.
Let us now recall the earlier discussion of sets varying over a poset while making
the following key definitions.
Definition 3.2
1. A sieve on W0 ∈ B in B is a subset (possibly empty) S of windows in B such that
(a) W ∈ S implies W ≥W0 (i.e., W ⊆ W0);
(b) W ∈ S and W ′ ≥W (i.e., W ′ ⊆W ) implies W ′ ∈ S.
Thus a sieve on W0 is an upper set in (B,≤) all of whose elements are coarse-
grainings of W0.
The set of all sieves on W0 is denoted Ω(W0).
2. A sieve S on W0 is d-consistent if every W ∈ S is d-consistent.
The following properties of sieves are crucial for our purposes.
1. For each W0, the set Ω(W0) of all sieves on W0 in B is a partially-ordered set
with S1 ≤ S2 being defined as S1 ⊆ S2. The greatest element 1 is the principal
sieve
↑(W0) := {W ∈ B | W ≥W0 } ≡ {W ∈ B |W ⊆W0 } (3.9)
and the least element 0 is the empty subset of windows.
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2. The poset Ω(W0) is a distributive lattice with the operations (i) S1∧S2 := S1∩S2;
and (ii) S1 ∨ S2 := S1 ∪ S2. In fact Ω(W0) is a Heyting algebra, i.e., given sieves
S1 and S2 there is a sieve (S1 ⇒ S2) such that
S ≤ (S1 ⇒ S2) if and only if S ∧ S1 ≤ S2. (3.10)
This sieve is defined as
(S1 ⇒ S2) := {W ⊆W0 | ∀W
′ ⊆ W if W ′ ∈ S1 then W
′ ∈ S2 }. (3.11)
In a Heyting algebra, the negation of an element x is defined by ¬x := (x⇒ 0).
Thus, for a sieve S on W0,
¬S := {W ⊆W0 | ∀W
′ ⊆W,W ′ 6∈ S }. (3.12)
As explained earlier, a central idea in the internal logic of varying sets is that the
Heyting algebra Ω(W0) serves as the space of semantic values for propositions at
the stage W0.
3. The collection Ω := {Ω(W ),W ∈ B} is a set varying over B under the definition,
for all pairs W1 ≤W2 (i.e., W2 ⊆W1),
ΩW1W2 : Ω(W1) → Ω(W2)
S 7→ S∩ ↑(W2) := {W ⊆W2 |W ∈ S }. (3.13)
We can also define the sets of d-consistent sieves
Ωd(W ) := {S ∈ Ω(W ) | S is d-consistent } (3.14)
and note that, like Ω, Ωd := {Ωd(W ),W ∈ B} is a set varying over (B,≤) if, for
W1 ≤W2, Ω
d
W1W2
: Ωd(W1)→ Ω
d(W2) is defined as Ω
d
W1W2
(S) := S∩ ↑(W2).
Finally, although no explicit use of it will be made here, we note that another simple
example of a set varying over (B,≤) is given by {DW ,W ∈ B} where DW is defined to
be the set of all decoherence functions for which W is a d-consistent window:
DW := {d ∈ D |W ∈ B
d}. (3.15)
This is a genuine object in SetB since if W2 is a coarse-graining of W1 (i.e., W1 ≤W2)
then if d is such that W1 is d-consistent (i.e., d ∈ DW1) then W2 is d-consistent too
(i.e., d ∈ DW2), and hence W1 ≤W2 implies that DW1 ⊆ DW2.
4 Semantic Values in Consistent Histories
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4.1 Realisable propositions
We come now to the main task of the paper: to formulate precisely the idea that a
second-level proposition like 〈α, p〉 (“the probability of the history proposition α being
true is p”) has a meaning only in the context of a window, and with a semantic value
that belongs to some logical structure associated with that window—in particular, we
anticipate that a semantic value can be identified with a sieve on the window.
Let us start by considering what is necessary for a proposition 〈α, p〉 to have any
meaning at all in the context of a particular window W and for a given decoherence
function d. Perhaps the simplest position to adopt here is that in order to be able to
‘realise’ α in the context of W , the history proposition α must belong to the Boolean
algebra W , and W must be d-consistent.21 This suggests the following definition:
Definition 4.1
A proposition α ∈ UP is d-realisable in a window W if (i) W is d-consistent; and
(ii) α ∈ W .
Then
Rd(W ) := {α |W ∈ Bd and α ∈ W } =
{
W if W ∈ Bd
∅ otherwise
(4.1)
is the set of all22 propositions that are d-realisable in W .
Continuing to reason in this heuristic way, we could argue next that even if a window
W0 is not d-consistent, the proposition 〈α, p〉 still has a meaning at stage W0 provided
that a coarse-graining W of W0 exists in which α is d-realisable. However, there may
be many such coarse-grainings, and the focal idea of the paper is that this should be
reflected by assigning an appropriate semantic value to 〈α, p〉—in the present case, a
natural choice would be the set of all coarse grainings of W0 in which α is d-realisable
(on the assumption that d(α, α) = p; if not, the semantic value is deemed to be the
empty set). In other words, we tentatively assign to the second-level proposition 〈α, p〉
the semantic value at stage W0 defined as
V dW0〈α, p〉 :=
{
{W ⊆ W0 |W ∈ B
d and α ∈ W } if d(α, α) = p;
∅ otherwise
(4.2)
which would make sense provided that the set of all such semantic values belongs to
some logical algebra.
However, this assignment does not work in the way we have been anticipating
because the right hand side of (4.2) is generally not a sieve on W0 (because if W
21Of course, it could be that d(α, α) = 0, but the statement that the state of affairs described by
the history proposition α has zero probability is still a positive prediction about the universe.
22This definition has the property that even the 0 and 1 history propositions are deemed not to
be d-realisable in a window that is not d-consistent. Of course, this does affect the fact that, for all
d ∈ D, d(0, 0) = 0, d(0, 1) = 0 and d(1, 1) = 1.
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belongs to V dW0〈α, p〉, then any W
′ ⊂W with α 6∈ W ′ will not do so). Thus we cannot
identify the set of possible semantic values with the Heyting algebra of the space of
sieves. In itself this does not rule out the use of (4.2) but it implies that any logical
structure on the set of semantic values must be obtained in a way that is different from
our anticipated use of the topos of varying sets SetB. One possibility is sketched in the
first appendix.
4.2 Accessible propositions
The problem with the suggested semantic value V dW0〈α, p〉 can be seen from a somewhat
different perspective by noting that Rd := {Rd(W ),W ∈ B} does not define a proper
varying set over B. This is because increasing the size of the window W (i.e., fine-
graining it) increases the number of propositions contained in W—which suggests that
W2 ⊆ W1 implies R
d(W2) ⊆ R
d(W1)—but it decreases the chances of d-consistency—
which suggests that W2 ⊆ W1 implies R
d(W2) ⊇ R
d(W1). The net effect is that
if W1 ≤ W2 there is no obvious relation between R
d(W1) and R
d(W2) and hence
no obvious candidate for the collection of maps RdW1W2 : R
d(W1) → R
d(W2) that is
necessary for Rd = {Rd(W ),W ∈ B} to be a varying set.
Note that a genuine varying set can be obtained by the simple expedient of replacing
the condition α ∈ W in (4.1) by α 6∈ W . This gives rise to a new concept: namely of
a proposition α being ‘unrealisable’, but this is not what we are seeking and therefore
further discussion is relegated to an appendix where it serves as a particularly simple
example of what is meant by an object in the topos SetB.
Evidently a new idea is needed of what it means to say that a proposition α is
‘realisable’ in a window W . On reflection, do we really require that α actually belongs
toW ? Surely it suffices ifW can be extended (i.e., fine-grained) to a bigger d-consistent
window that does contain α?
This new concept differs subtly from the earlier version of ‘realisability’ and the ter-
minology should reflect this. We are thus lead to introduce a new family of second-level
propositions of the form “α is d-accessible” where α ∈ UP . As with the second-level
propositions 〈α, p〉, there is no reference to windows per se, and I shall indicate this
by referring to propositions of this type as global. However, the key idea we wish to
develop is that—as hinted at above in the example of d-realisability—in order to inter-
pret a global proposition within the framework of the consistent-histories programme
it is first necessary to ‘localise’ it by constructing secondary versions that do refer to
windows. Then we can introduce the notion of the ‘semantic value at a stageW0’ of the
global proposition, and we find that it does indeed lie in a Heyting algebra. The aim
is to use the topos-theoretic ideas discussed earlier so that, in particular, the Heyting
algebra appropriate to a stage W0 is the set Ω(W0) of sieves on W0 in (B,≤).
We begin with the following definition of the ‘localised’ version of the new family
of global propositions “α is d-accessible”, denoted 〈α,Ad〉.
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Definition 4.2
A proposition α ∈ UP is d-accessible from a window W if there exists W ′ ⊇ W
such that (i) α ∈ W ′; and (ii) W ′ is d-consistent.23
Then
Ad(W ) := {α | ∃W ′ ⊇W s.t. W ′ ∈ Bd and α ∈ W ′ } (4.3)
is the set of all propositions that are d-accessible from W . Note that this can be
rewritten as
Ad(W ) = {α | ∃W ′ ⊇W s.t. α ∈ Rd(W ′) } (4.4)
where Rd(W ) was defined in (4.1). Thus a proposition α is d-accessible from a window
W if and only if there exists some fine-graining W ′ of W in which α is d-realisable.
The following properties of these sets are crucial for our purposes.
1. If W1 ≤ W2 then A
d(W1) ⊆ A
d(W2), and hence, unlike the case for R
d, the
collection Ad := {Ad(W ),W ∈ B} is a genuine varying set over (B,≤) with
AdW1W2 : A
d(W1) → A
d(W2) defined as subset inclusion. In this sense, ‘acces-
sibility’ works while ‘realisability’ fails. As we shall see, this new object Ad in
SetB is the crucial ingredient in my topos-based semantics for interpreting the
second-level propositions 〈α, p〉 in the consistent-histories programme.
2. The varying set Ad is a subobject of the constant varying set ∆UP in SetB,
∆UP(W ) := UP for all W ∈ B. (4.5)
Hence there is a characteristic morphism χA
d
: ∆UP → Ω in the topos SetB
which, according to (2.21), is defined at any stage W0 by (c.f., (2.8))
χA
d
W0
: ∆UP(W0) → Ω(W0) (4.6)
α 7→ {W ≥W0 | α ∈ A
d(W ) }
= {W ⊆W0 | ∃W
′ ⊇W s.t. W ′ ∈ Bd and α ∈ W ′ }
where, as can readily be checked, the right hand side is a bona fide sieve on W0.
The sieve on the right hand side of (4.6)—which actually belongs to the subset
Ωd(W0) of Ω(W0)—is interpreted as the semantic value at the stage W0 of the global
proposition “α is d-accessible”. Note that, by the property (2.22) of a characteristic
morphism, a history proposition α is d-accessible from a window W if and only if
χA
d
W (α) =↑(W ) (4.7)
23Note that this implies that W itself must be d-consistent—no propositions are accessible from a
non d-consistent window.
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where ↑(W ) = {W ′ ∈ B |W ≤W ′} is the unit 1 of the Heyting algebra Ω(W ).
The definition (4.6) of χA
d
: ∆UP → Ω and property (4.7) illustrate the essentially
‘fuzzy’ nature24 of subobjects in SetB. More precisely, if α is d-accessible from W then
χA
d
W (α) = 1; but even if α is not d-accessible from a windowW0, the proposition 〈α,A
d〉
is still ascribed a semantic value at stage W0 that is generically not the null element 0
(the empty sieve) of the Heyting algebra Ω(W0): namely, the set of all coarse-grainings
W of W0 from which α is d-accessible. Thus the semantic value at stage W0 of the
global proposition “α is d-accessible” is a measure of the extent to which W0 needs to
be changed in order that α does become d-accessible from it. Hence coarse-graining
a window is the analogue in the consistent-histories theory of choosing a later time in
the example of sets-through-time discussed earlier (compare (4.7) with (2.9)).
A key role for Ω is to impart a logical structure to the collection of all global
propositions, and the first step in this direction is to note that (4.6) can be used
to define what is known in the topos literature as a global element of the object Ω,
i.e., a morphism 1 → Ω in SetB where 1 is the terminal object25 in SetB defined by
1(W ) := {∗} (the set with one element) for all W ∈ B. Specifically, for each α ∈ UP
we define χ˜A
d
(α) : 1→ Ω by specifying its components χ˜A
d
(α)W0 : 1(W0)→ Ω(W0) to
be
χ˜A
d
(α)W0(∗) := χ
Ad
W0
(α) (4.8)
where the right hand side is given by (4.6). In turn, this produces a map26
χ˜A
d
: UP → HomSetB(1,Ω) (4.9)
where HomSetB(1,Ω) denotes the set of morphisms from 1 to Ω in the topos category
SetB.
By these means, to each global proposition 〈α,Ad〉 we can associate a corresponding
‘valuation’ morphism
V 〈α,Ad〉 : 1→ Ω (4.10)
where V 〈α,Ad〉 := χ˜A
d
(α) is a global element of Ω; i.e., V is a map from global
propositions to global elements. In normal set theory, a map from {∗} (the terminal
object in the category of sets) to a set X picks out a unique element of X , and (4.10)
24This is not a coincidence: fuzzy set theory can be viewed as a sub-branch of topos theory.
25An object 1 is said to be a terminal object in a category if there is just one morphism from any
other object to 1; it is easy to see that any two terminal objects are isomorphic. In the category of
sets a terminal object is any set {∗} with just a single element. In this case a morphism is just a map,
and hence a morphism {∗} → X picks out a unique element of X .
26We are exploiting here the fact that the constant presheaf functor ∆ : Set → SetB is left adjoint
to the ‘global sections’ functor Γ : SetB → Set where, for any object F in SetB, we have ΓF :=
HomSetB(1, F ). This adjointness relation gives rise to a natural isomorphism HomSetB(∆S, F ) ≃
HomSet(S,ΓF ) for any set S. In our case the set S is UP and the functor F is Ω; thus the isomorphism
of interest is HomSetB(∆UP ,Ω) ≃ HomSet(UP ,ΓΩ). The element in HomSetB(∆UP ,Ω) with which
we are concerned is χA
d
and its image in HomSet(UP ,ΓΩ) is what we have denoted χ˜A
d
. Thus
χ˜A
d
(α) ∈ ΓΩ = HomSetB(1,Ω).
19
can be regarded as the analogue of this procedure in the category SetB of varying sets.
Thus (4.10) encapsulates the idea that in our topos interpretation of the consistent-
histories formalism, a ‘generalised truth value’ is associated to each global proposition
〈α,Ad〉—namely the global element V 〈α,Ad〉 : 1→ Ω of Ω.
Referring to (4.10) as a ‘valuation’ seems to imply that it preserves some logical
structure on the propositions 〈α,Ad〉. However, we do not have any such structure a
priori : rather, the intention of (4.10) is to use the Heyting algebra structure of Ω to
define a logical algebra on the global propositions 〈α,Ad〉—a goal that can be achieved
by associating each such second-level proposition with the corresponding global element
of Ω. For example, if V 〈α,Ad〉 : 1 → Ω and V 〈β,Ad〉 : 1 → Ω are global elements of
Ω corresponding to the global propositions 〈α,Ad〉 and 〈β,Ad〉 respectively then the
global proposition “〈α,Ad〉 and 〈β,Ad〉” is associated27 with the global element of Ω
defined by the chain
1
<V 〈α,Ad〉,V 〈β,Ad〉>
−→ Ω× Ω
∧
−→ Ω (4.11)
where ∧ : Ω×Ω→ Ω is the ‘and’ operation in the Heyting algebra structure on Ω. This
is a rather sophisticated analogue of the treatment of 〈α, p〉 ∧ 〈β, q〉 by the expression
(2.5) in the context of our earlier discussion of second-level propositions in a classical
theory.
Note however that the map χ˜A
d
in (4.9) is not one-to-one, and hence neither is
the valuation map 〈α,Ad〉 7→ V 〈α,Ad〉 that associates a global element of Ω with each
〈α,Ad〉. Thus—analogous again to our discussion in section 2.1 of classical second-level
propositions—we are lead to define two global propositions as being d-semantically
equivalent if they are associated with the same global element of Ω (with a given
decoherence function d): properly speaking, it is only to the equivalence classes of such
propositions that the logical algebra applies.
For example, although in the construction (4.6) the quantity ∆UP is regarded
purely as a set and the orthoalgebra structure plays no a priori role, nevertheless—
since W is a Boolean subalgebra of UP—if α ∈ W then ¬α ∈ W and vice versa. Hence
α 6∈ W if and only if ¬α 6∈ W , which implies that, for all α ∈ UP ,
χA
d
W0
(α) = χA
d
W0
(¬α). (4.12)
Thus 〈α,Ad〉 and 〈¬α,Ad〉 are d-semantically equivalent28 for any α ∈ UP and for all
decoherence functions d.
27Note that “〈α,Ad〉 and 〈β,Ad〉” is not itself of the form 〈γ,Ad〉 for any γ ∈ UP . It is thus more
accurate to think of the propositions 〈α,Ad〉, α ∈ UP as generators of a logical algebra.
28I am grateful to Pen Maddy for the gnomic remark that this conclusion is consistent with propo-
sition 4.0621 in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus .
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4.3 The semantic values for 〈α, p〉
Finally we are in a position to treat the main goal of the paper, namely propositions of
the type 〈α, p〉—“the probability of history proposition α being true is p”. All we have
to do is to supplement the requirement of d-accessibility with the additional condition
d(α, α) = p. Thus I propose to interpret the global proposition 〈α, p〉 by specifying it
to have the following ‘localised’ form:
Definition 4.3
The proposition 〈α, p〉 is d-accessible from a window W if (i) α is d-accessible
from W ; and (ii) d(α, α) = p.
Let Ad,p(W ) denote the set of all propositions α ∈ UP such that 〈α, p〉 is d-accessible
from W :
Ad,p(W ) := {α | ∃W ′ ⊇W s.t. W ′ ∈ Bd, α ∈ W ′, and d(α, α) = p }. (4.13)
These sets obey the basic condition W1 ≤ W2 implies A
d,p(W1) ⊆ A
d,p(W2) and hence,
for each p ∈ [0, 1], Ad,p := {Ad,p(W ),W ∈ B} is a varying set over B.
The varying set Ad,p is a subobject of the constant varying set ∆UP , and hence for
each decoherence function d (an analogue of the state σ that arises in (2.3)) and each
p ∈ [0, 1] we get the crucial characteristic morphism χd,p : ∆UP → Ω in SetB whose
components are the maps χd,pW0 : ∆UP(W0)→ Ω(W0), W0 ∈ B, defined by
χ
d,p
W0
(α) :=
{
{W ⊆W0 | ∃W
′ ⊇W with W ′ ∈ Bd and α ∈ W ′ } if d(α, α) = p;
∅ otherwise.
(4.14)
The right hand side of (4.14) is a genuine sieve and is to be regarded as the semantic
value at stage W0 of the global proposition 〈α, p〉 “the state of affairs represented by
the history proposition α ∈ UP has probability p of occurring”.
As was the case with 〈α,Ad〉, the global proposition 〈α, p〉 can be associated with
a global element χ˜d,p(α) : 1 → Ω whose components χ˜d,p(α)W0 : 1(W0) → Ω(W0) are
defined as χ˜d,p(α)W0(∗) := χ
d,p
W0
(α). Putting together these various results we finally
arrive at the desired ‘valuation morphism’
V d〈α, p〉 : 1→ Ω (4.15)
whose components V d〈α, p〉W0 : 1(W0)→ Ω(W0) are given by
V d〈α, p〉W0(∗) =
{
{W ⊆W0 | ∃W
′ ⊇ W s.t. W ′ ∈ Bd and α ∈ W ′ } if d(α, α) = p;
∅ otherwise.
(4.16)
The topos result (4.16) should be compared with the simple expression (2.4) that
applies in a more conventional probability theory. Once again we see the ‘fuzzy-set’
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nature of the topos scheme in the sense that at any particular stageW0 the proposition
〈α, p〉 may be assigned a semantic value other than 0 := ∅ or 1 :=↑(W0).
As in the earlier example of the second-level propositions 〈α,Ad〉, it is appropriate
to define two global propositions 〈α, p〉 and 〈β, q〉 to be ‘d-semantically-equivalent’ if
they are associated with the same global element of Ω, i.e., if their semantic values
are equal in all windows. For example, it is clear from (4.16) that, for all decoherence
functions d, the second-level propositions 〈α, p〉 and 〈¬α, 1 − p〉 are d-semantically
equivalent for all α ∈ UP and all p ∈ [0, 1]. This is because if α belongs to some
window W ′ then so does ¬α. Furthermore, if W ′ is d-consistent then d(α,¬α) = 0 and
hence, by additivity of the decoherence function d,
1 = d(1, 1) = d(α⊕ ¬α, α⊕ ¬α) = d(α, α) + d(¬α,¬α) (4.17)
which shows that d(¬α,¬α) = 1− d(α, α).
By these means, the (equivalence classes of) global propositions of the type 〈α, p〉
generate a logical algebra as a subalgebra of the Heyting algebra on the set HomSetB(1,Ω)
of global elements of Ω in SetB. The expression (4.15)—with its component ver-
sion (4.16)—represents the final form of our analysis of the logical structure of the
consistent-history propositions “the probability that α ∈ UP is realised is p” in the
context of topos theory.
5 Conclusions
A key ingredient in the consistent-histories formulation of quantum theory is the exis-
tence of d-consistent sets of propositions. We have argued that, in the approach where
a preferred set is not selected once and for all, the ensuing many world-views semantics
can be described mathematically with a topos-theoretic framework based on the idea of
sets varying over the partially-ordered set B of all Boolean subalgebras of the orthoal-
gebra of history propositions. In particular, we have seen how a global proposition such
as “the probability of the history proposition α being true is p” can be interpreted in a
way that identifies any window W0 ∈ B as a potential ‘stage’ and where the semantic
values at each such stage lie in a Heyting algebra. This situation stems from the cen-
tral claim that each global proposition can be identified with a global element 1 → Ω
of the space Ω of truth values in the topos category SetB. Propositions of this type
in the consistent-histories programme include 〈α,Ad〉, 〈α, p〉 and (as discussed in the
second appendix) 〈α, Ud〉. The collection of d-semantic equivalence classes of all29 such
propositions generates a logical structure that is inherited from that of Ω. It should
be emphasised once more that, in practice, the space UP may simply be the set of
projection operators on some Hilbert space, in which case the analysis of the crucial
poset B is a viable concrete task.
29Mixed propositions—for example, “〈α,Ud〉 and 〈β, p〉”—are allowed.
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The general conclusion of this paper is that topos methods provide a natural mathe-
matical framework in which to discuss the inner logical structure that lies behind ideas
of many windows, or world-views, in the quantum theory of histories. One general
aim of this approach is to avoid the instrumentalism that dominates much conven-
tional thinking about quantum theory although—as is not infrequently the case—it is
difficult to give a simple physical picture of what the formalism means in these circum-
stances. However, if we accept the idea that ‘classical realism’ is associated in some
way with a Boolean algebra of propositions, then we have to say that—because of its
intrinsic Heyting algebra logic—the ‘many windows’ interpretation of the decoherent
histories formalism corresponds to a type of neo-realism that, on the one hand, is
more complicated and subtle than the simple realism of classical physics but which, on
the other hand, does not go as far as the non-distributive structure that characterises
quantum logic proper. Of course, this does not affect the the fact that the underlying
orthoalgebra UP of history propositions is a genuine quantum logic.
In the context of ‘many world-views’ it is worth noting that the concept of a propo-
sition being ‘d-accessible’ from a window W clearly extends to Boolean subalgebras in
general: i.e., we can say that a window W ′ is d-accessible from a window W if there
exists a d-consistent window W ′′ that contains both W ′ and W ; a single proposition α
is then d-accessible from W in the sense of (4.3) if and only if the window {0, 1, α,¬α}
is d-accessible from W in the sense just described. However, this is just the consistent-
histories analogue of the idea of ‘relative possibility’ introduced by Kripke (1963) in his
original study of the semantics of intuitionistic modal logic (see also Loux, 1979). This
suggests that modal concepts such as ‘necessity’ or ‘possibility’ should find a natural
home in the quantum formalism of consistent histories, but this remains a topic for
future work.
The topos-theoretic ideas used in the present paper are rather elementary, being
essentially restricted to the theory of presheafs on a poset, and there is a lot more to
the subject than that. However, even at the simple level of the theory of varying sets
it seems clear that the ideas discussed here could find applications in other areas of
quantum theory where some type of contextuality arises. An example might be the
idea of ‘relational quantum theory’ that has been actively developed recently by several
authors; for example Crane (1995), Smolin (1995) and Rovelli (1995). It also seems
possible that the well-known contextuality of truth values in standard quantum theory
(i.e., the Kochen-Specker theorem) could be explored profitably from this perspective.
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A An Alternative Approach
I shall sketch here a method whereby it is possible to assign the set (c.f. (4.2))
Γdα(W0) := {W ⊆W0 |W ∈ B
d and α ∈ W } (A.1)
as the semantic value at stage W0 of the global proposition 〈α, p〉 (on the supposition
that d(α, α) = p) even though the right hand side of (A.1) is not a sieve on W0 in
(B,≤).
The first observation is that—assuming for simplicity that d(α, α) = p and d(β, β) =
q—if Γdα(W0) and Γ
d
β(W0) were to be the semantic values of propositions 〈α, p〉 and 〈β, q〉
respectively at stageW0 then the global proposition “〈α, p〉 or〈β, q〉” would presumably
be represented at stage W0 by the set
Γdα(W0) ∪ Γ
d
β(W0) = {W ⊆W0 |W ∈ B
d, α ∈ W } ∪ {W ⊆W0 | W ∈ B
d, β ∈ W }
= {W ⊆W0 |W ∈ B
d and (α ∈ W or β ∈ W ) }
= {W ⊆W0 |W ∈ B
d and {α, β} ∩W 6= ∅ }. (A.2)
Since the right hand side of (A.2) is not itself of the form Γdγ(W0) we do not have
algebraic closure. However, the structure of (A.2) is suggestive and leads to the idea
of defining the ‘trapped’ sets
T dF (W0) := {W ⊆W0 | W ∈ B
d and F ∩W 6= ∅ } (A.3)
where F is any finite set of propositions from UP. Note that Γdα(W0) ≡ T
d
{α}(W0).
The collection of all such sets is closed under the union operation since
T dF (W0) ∪ T
d
G(W0) = T
d
F∪G(W0) (A.4)
although under intersections we have
T dF (W0) ∩ T
d
G(W0) = {W ⊆W0 | W ∈ B
d and (F ∩W 6= ∅ & G ∩W 6= ∅) }. (A.5)
Closure can be re-established by defining the collections of subalgebras
T dF1,F2,...,Fm(W0) := (A.6)
{W ⊆W0 |W ∈ Bd and (F1 ∩W 6= ∅ & F2 ∩W 6= ∅, . . . , & Fm ∩W 6= ∅) }
where F1, F2, . . . , Fm is any finite collection of finite sets of propositions in UP .
A simple way of using these sets to generate a logical algebra follows from the
following observation. There is a well known topology (the Vietoris topology) that can
be placed on the set of all closed subsets of a topological space and which involves
trapping sets, rather as in (A.3). Motivated by what is done in the Vietoris situation
the natural procedure in our case is to define a topology τd on B by taking as a subbasis
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the collection of all sets of the form T dF (W ) as F ranges of all finite subsets of UP and
W ranges over all Boolean subalgebras of UP. The open sets of the topological space
(B, τd) can then serve as the semantic values of our system.
Notice that this procedure does indeed produce a logical structure since the collec-
tion of open sets in any topological space is always a Heyting algebra. However, this
is rather far from our original idea of presheafs on the partially-ordered set (B,≤) and
needs to be treated as a separate theory.
B Unrealisable Propositions
The ‘localised’ form of a new, and rather simple, global proposition “α is d-unrealisable”
(denoted 〈α, Ud〉) is given by the following definition.
Definition 2.1
A proposition α ∈ UP is d-unrealisable in a window W if (i) W is d-consistent;
and (ii) α 6∈ W .
Thus we can define
Ud(W ) := {α |W ∈ Bd and α 6∈ W } =
{
UP −W if W ∈ Bd
∅ if W 6∈ Bd
(B.1)
as the set of all propositions30 that are d-unrealisable in the window W . We note that:
1. If W1 ≤ W2 then U
d(W1) ⊆ U
d(W2) and hence, unlike the case for R
d, the
collection Ud := {Ud(W ),W ∈ B} is a genuine varying set over the poset (B,≤)
if the maps UdW1W2 : U
d(W1) → U
d(W2), W1 ≤ W2, are defined to be the subset
inclusions.
2. The object Ud in SetB can be regarded as a subobject of the constant varying set
∆UP in SetB. The associated characteristic morphism is
χU
d
W0
: ∆UP(W0) → Ω(W0)
α 7→ {W ≥ W0 | α ∈ U
d(W ) }
= {W ⊆ W0 |W ∈ B
d and α 6∈ W }. (B.2)
As was the case with 〈α,Ad〉, the new global proposition 〈α, Ud〉 can be associated
with a global element of the Heyting algebra Ω via the morphism
χ˜U
d
(α) : 1→ Ω (B.3)
30Note that, according to this definition, the 0 and 1 history propositions are never d-unrealisable.
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whose components are defined by χ˜U
d
(α)W0(∗) := χ
Ud
W0
(α) (c.f. (4.8)). There is an
associated valuation morphism V 〈α, Ud〉 : 1 → Ω where V 〈α, Ud〉 := χ˜U
d
(α). We also
note that, analogously to (4.12),
χU
d
W0
(α) = χU
d
W0
(¬α) (B.4)
for all windows W0 and all α ∈ UP . Thus 〈α, U
d〉 and 〈¬α, Ud〉 are d-semantically
equivalent for any α ∈ UP and for all decoherence functions d.
Finally we remark that one might have tried to use these results to resolve the
‘realisability’ problem by defining a proposition α ∈ UP to be d-realisable in a window
if it is not d-unrealisable there. This involves taking the negation31 of the variable set
Ud in the appropriate Heyting algebra of subobjects of the constant variable set ∆UP .
The result is the variable set ¬Ud := {¬Ud(W ),W ∈ B} where
¬Ud(W ) = {α | ∀W ′ ≥W,α 6∈ Ud(W ′) }
= {α | ∀W ′ ⊆W,W ′ 6∈ Bd or α ∈ W ′ }. (B.5)
However, since W ′ := {0, 1} is a d-consistent coarse-graining of any window W it
follows that ¬Ud(W ) = {0, 1}—a rather small number of ‘realisable’ propositions!
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